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THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND NUTRALOAF: A
RECIPE FOR DISASTER
Alexander J. Spanos∗

And if, from malice to an individual, or vindictive feeling, or a disposition to
oppress, he inflicted punishment beyond that which, in his sober judgment,
he would have thought necessary, he is liable to this action.1
I. OVERVIEW
In the Spring of 2012, in Prude v. Clarke, Judge Richard A. Posner ruled
that an inmate’s exclusive diet of “nutriloaf,” (also spelled nutraloaf) a foultasting food given to prisoners as a form of punishment, violated the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.2 The facts
show that the inmate weighed 168 pounds prior to a ten-day stay awaiting
trial.3 However, over several different stays at a correctional facility this
particular inmate lost 8.3 percent of his body weight after being subjected
exclusively to nutraloaf meals (a.k.a. “prison meat loaf”), which is
purposefully distributed to curb unwanted behavior of certain inmates,
including for those found spitting, misusing utensils, throwing of projectiles
and other bodily wastes at guards, and he was down to 154 pounds by the
end of a ten-day period.4 This particular inmate’s symptoms included severe
vomiting and bloody stools, and he also developed a painful anal fissure
upon his return to state prison. 5 During one visit to the county jail
infirmary, a nurse described his weight loss as “alarming.”6

	
  
∗ Staff Associate, Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy; J.D. (expected
2014)—The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A. (2009)—
College of the Holy Cross.
1. Dinsman v. Wilkes, 53 U.S. 390, 404, 13 L. Ed. 1036 (1851) (noting, in dicta,
the permissible bounds that a commanding officer must remain within while dealing with
a subordinate and punishment). Although Dinsman did not include an Eighth
Amendment assertion of cruel and unusual punishment, this statement represents an early
Supreme Court ruling where justices were concerned with the subjective intent of an
authority figure in charge.
2. Prude v. Clarke, 675 F.3d 732, 734 (7th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied (Apr. 19, 2012).
3. Id. at 733.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 734.
6. Id.

222

2013]

The Eighth Amendment and Nutraloaf

223

The primary goal of this note is to address the rationale behind arguments
that serving nutraloaf to inmates throughout the United States constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment. The second section of this note introduces
the evolution of cruel and unusual punishment claims in the context of the
Eighth Amendment, owing particular thanks to the scholarship of Michael
B. Mushlin on the topic. In particular, section two focuses on three key
Supreme Court decisions that sought to harmonize what the standard of
analysis for cruel and unusual punishment claims would be. Next, section
three examines the complex relationship between food and prisoners by
touching on the various power struggles that exist between subordinate
inmates and authority figures. Subsequently, the fourth section of this note
provides a cross-section of judicial opinions on cruel and unusual
punishment cases to better highlight the range of claims inmates typically
raise while incarcerated. Part five of this note exclusively deals with inmate
challenges that involve food. Similarly, part six of this note solely focuses
on judicial decisions involving prisoners and nutraloaf, with the main
emphasis on Prude v. Clarke and its critique. Finally, in conclusion, this
note attempts to synthesize the lessons of past cruel and unusual punishment
cases regarding serving nutraloaf to prisoners, and concluding that so long as
prisoners are being served a nutritionally sufficient meal, an inmates’
personal qualms with nutraloaf’s taste or appeal is irrelevant. Conditions of
confinement are not meant to be easy or tailored to individual preferences of
inmates, and the best way to avoid an unpleasant or foul-tasting meal is the
refrain from the kinds of food infractions that result in the distribution of
nutraloaf in the first place.
II. UNDERSTANDING CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
A. Evolution of Eighth Amendment Protections
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, articulates subtle, yet
necessary protections for current prisoners.7 Among other things, the Eighth
Amendment guarantees that no “cruel and unusual punishments [shall be]
inflicted.”8 Historically, the desire to prevent cruel and unusual punishment
stemmed from concern over arbitrary and egregious judgments during James

	
  
7. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962 (1991) (citing Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962)).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
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II’s reign in England.9 The prohibition appeared initially in the Bill of
Rights of 1689.10
Prior to 1976, the United States Supreme Court seldom addressed the
scope of the Eight Amendment’s protections regarding inmates and prison
conditions. 11 During that time, Eighth Amendment cases were granted
certiorari only in situations where sentences were grossly disproportionate to
crimes.12 However, a shift occurred between 1976 and 1994, when the
Supreme Court decided seven cases that dealt with prisoner rights and prison
conditions rather than sentencing challenges.13

	
  
9. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 967-68 (“Most historians agree that the ‘cruel[] and
unusual[] punishments’ provision of the English Declaration of Rights was prompted by
the abuses attributed to the infamous Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys of the King’s Bench
during the Stuart reign of James II . . . . [R]ecently historians have argued, and the best
historical evidence suggests, that it was not Jeffreys’ management of the Bloody Assizes
that led to the Declaration of Rights provision, but rather the arbitrary sentencing power
he had exercised in administering justice from the King’s Bench.”).
10. What Is Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 24 HARV. L. REV. 54, 54-55 (1910); see
also MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 638-46 (noting the use of a pillory, a wooden
device where a prisoner’s head and limbs were inserted and secured in place, so as to
induce public humiliation from a passerby); but compare Anthony F. Granucci, Nor
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839,
851 (1969) (arguing that the American framers misinterpreted the intent of the English
Bill of Rights drafters, and also suggesting, inter alia, that in 1641 a Puritan attorney,
Rev. Nathaniel Ward of Ipswich, Massachusetts, drafted a document under the title Body
of Liberties). With respect to Rev. Ward’s Body of Liberties, clause 46 said the following:
“For bodily punishments we allow amongst us none that are inhumane, barbarous or
cruel.” Id. at 851.
11. Michael B. Mushlin, Chapter 3: The Eighth Amendment: Solitary Confinement,
Prevention of Violence, Protection Against Overcrowding, and Provisions of The
Necessities of Life in RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 69 (Thompson/West 4th ed., 2009).
12. Id.; see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) (striking down
minimum imprisonment of 12 years, one day in chains and lifetime surveillance for a
crime of falsifying an official document); but see In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447
(1890) (discussing the extent of constitutional limitations of cruel and unusual
punishments by suggesting, “[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word
as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,-something
more than the mere extinguishment of life.”).
13. Mushlin, supra note 11, at 69. See generally Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312
(1986); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992);
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
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In 1976, Estelle v. Gamble marked the first Supreme Court case
specifically addressing the Eight Amendment’s protections from cruel and
unusual punishment with respect to an inmate’s health conditions.14 In
Estelle, a Texas state prisoner filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights
complaint15 alleging, inter alia, that a medical director and two corrections
officials subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment when they failed to
provide adequate treatment for a back injury he allegedly sustained while
engaged in a prison-work assignment.16 The majority opinion in Estelle
reinforced a rather common-sense notion that “infliction of such unnecessary
suffering [upon inmates] is inconsistent with contemporary standards of
decency.”17 However, Estelle ultimately stood for the proposition that in
order for a prisoner to state a cognizable claim, “a prisoner must allege acts
or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs.”18 While the Estelle decision first introduced the
term “deliberate indifference” into the Eighth Amendment conversation, the
Court did not make efforts to truly define the term’s meaning.19
The next Supreme Court decision addressing Eighth Amendment
protections regarding prison conditions occurred five years later, in Rhodes
v. Chapman. 20 Rhodes involved a claim by two prisoners held at a
maximum-security state prison in Lucasville, Ohio, who alleged the prison’s

	
  
14. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (“An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his
medical needs. . . . In the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce physical
[torture or death. . . . In less serious cases, denial of medical care may result in pain and
suffering which no one would suggest would serve any penological purpose.”).
15. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (“Section 1983 ‘is not itself a
source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred.’” (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).
16. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106-07 (finding that no “deliberate indifference” occurred
when an inmate’s medical treatment consisted of approximately seventeen visits with
medical personnel over a three month span).
17. Id. at 103. See also id. at 103 n.8 (referencing more than twenty State codes
dealing with the treatment of prisoners or rules for the operation correctional facilities. In
addition, noting that “[m]any states have also adopted regulations which specify, in
varying degrees of detail, the standards of medical care to be provided to prisoners.”). See
also Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926) (articulating the common-law
view of prisoners that “the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot, by
reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.”).
18. 429 U.S. at 106 (emphasis added).
19. Mushlin, supra note 11, at 70, 70 n.3 (“The term [deliberate indifference] had not
been used by the Supreme Court prior to Estelle.”).
20. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
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policy of “double celling” constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 21
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell wrote that the “gravamen of their
complaint was that double celling confined inmates too closely.”22 But here,
the Rhodes Court found that prison conditions, even those that some may
consider harsh, are merely a consequence of the debt that criminal offenders
pay for offenses against society.23 Justice Powell also famously stated, “the
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons,” and he noted that
maximum-security prison conditions “cannot be free of discomfort.” 24
Ultimately, the Rhodes Court held that any double-celling was necessitated
by an unforeseen surge in the prison population, and any effects on inmates
were negligible at best and “did not lead to deprivations of essential food,
medical care, or sanitation.”25
With respect to the evolution of Eighth Amendment analysis on cruel and
unusual punishment, Rhodes had a significant impact insofar as the Court
specifically declined to focus on the prison officials’ subjective states of
mind, and instead looked to an objective inquiry into the prison conditions in
question.26 However, this alternate approach put Rhodes and Estelle slightly
at odds, as a deliberate indifference standard articulated in Estelle
“require[d] some inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind.”27

	
  
21. Id. at 339-40 (explaining that double celling is a policy where two prisoners are
put in cells typically designed for one due to overpopulation). See also Chapdelaine v.
Keller, No. 95-CV-1126, 1998 WL 357350, at *4-5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1998) (finding no
Eighth Amendment violation for a double-celling policy despite inmates’ complaints
about cell crowding, inadequate ventilation, no ladder access to the top bunk, and no
private sanitary facilities).
22. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 340-41 (“Each cell at SOCF measures approximately 63
square feet. Each contains a bed measuring 36 by 80 inches, a cabinet-type night stand, a
wall-mounted sink with hot and cold running water, and a toilet that the inmate can flush
from inside the cell. Cells housing two inmates have a two-tiered bunk bed.”).
23. Id. at 347.
24. Id. at 349.
25. Id. at 348 (“Although job and educational opportunities diminished marginally as
a result of double celling, limited work hours and delay before receiving education do not
inflict pain . . . [w]e would have to wrench the Eighth Amendment from its language and
history to hold that delay of these desirable aids to rehabilitation violates the
Constitution.”).
26. Mushlin, supra note 11, at 72 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)).
27. Id. at 73. But see Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (“Eighth
Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of
individual Justices; judgments should be informed by objective factors to the maximum
possible extent.”) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
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Five years later, in Whitley v. Albers, the Supreme Court addressed an
action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by an inmate who was shot in the leg
by a prison guard that was attempting to free another officer held hostage
during a prison riot.28 The Whitley Court rejected the inmate’s claim that the
shooting violated the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishments by focusing on the pressing exigent circumstances that
the guards faced during the riot.29 The Court concluded that, for an inmate
to prevail, he or she must show that the shooting occurred “maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”30 In other words, the
Whitley Court focused on the subjective element of how force was applied—
and whether or not the force was applied in a “good faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline.”31
At this point, the Court had articulated three distinct tests for Eighth
Amendment challenges regarding cruel and unusual punishment, causing a
lack of consensus 32 Where Estelle initially articulated a deliberate
indifference standard, and Rhodes highlighted the importance of objectivity,
the Whitley decision represented a shift towards subjectivity.33 The Whitley
Court expressed concern that a deliberate indifference standard might not
adequately “capture the importance” of competing factors such as the mental
state of prison officials.34 Until 1991, no definitive test was in place that
one might look to in determining the constitutionality of cruel and unusual
punishment claims.
B. Harmonizing Estelle, Rhodes, and Whitley
In 1991, the Court attempted to “rationalize and harmonize” its previous
decisions in Estelle, Rhodes, and Whitley with respect to the Eighth
Amendment and prison conditions in Wilson v. Seiter.35 Wilson involved a
42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit from an Ohio inmate who alleged that certain

	
  
28. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
29. Mushlin, supra note 11, at 73-74 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986)
(“It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize
the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.”).
30. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 313.
31. Id. at 320-21 (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
32. Mushlin, supra note 11, at 74.
33. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21.
34. Id. (noting that relevant factors should be considered in a subjective analysis of
the action undertaken by prison officials, such as the need for any application of force as
well as the relationship between the need and amount of force utilized).
35. Mushlin, supra note 11, at 76 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991)).
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conditions of his incarceration amounted to cruel and unusual punishment,
including, but not limited to, complaints about excessive noise, deficient
locker space, unhygienic dining services and food preparation, and unclean
restrooms.36 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, focused on the text of
the Eighth Amendment which “bans only cruel and unusual punishment,”
and reasoned that any punishment not formally enumerated through a
judge’s sentence requires a subjective analysis into an inflicting officer’s
state of mind.37 On this specific point, Justice Scalia quoted the following
observations made by Judge Posner in Duckworth v. Franzen:
The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise
or deter. This is what the word means today; it is what it meant in
the eighteenth century. . . . [I]f [a] guard accidentally stepped on
[a] prisoner’s toe and broke it, this would not be punishment in
anything remotely like the accepted meaning of the word, whether
we consult the usage of 1791, or 1868, or 1985.38
However, the Wilson Court concluded that all Eighth Amendment prison
claims must both be “supported by proof of an objective and a subjective
component.”39 In other words, plaintiffs must not only meet a burden of
establishing that prison conditions are objectively cruel and unusual, but
additionally satisfy that those conditions stem from subjective, “culpable
acts by agents of the state.”40
C. The Objective and Subjective Test
As set forth in Trop v. Dulles, the Eighth Amendment’s meaning is rooted
in the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”41 Thus, what may have been recognized as permissible decades or

	
  
36. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296 (1991).
37. Id. at 300-01.
38. Id. at 300 (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986) (rejecting allegations of cruel and unusual punishment
stemming from a 1979 fire aboard a bus carrying handcuffed prisoners between Illinois
prisons). The doors of the bus were sealed for security purposes and dense smoke filled
the bus. Twenty one inmates were injured, and one inmate died. Duckworth, 780 F.2d at
648.
39. Mushlin, supra, note 11 at 76 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991))
(emphasis added).
40. Id. at 78 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
41. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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centuries earlier, may not necessarily be morally or legally tolerable in
modern times.42
In a post-Wilson era, two tests were available for an inquiry regarding a
prisoner’s Eighth Amendment challenge—one subjective and one
objective. 43 With respect to the objective prong, the question at issue
became whether or not a condition was so serious that it might require
protection or relief; whereas the subjective prong looked to whether or not
prison administrators and officials had a culpable mindset in their decisions
that punished or affected inmates.44 Because these tests are independent of
each other, a reviewing court could apply them in whatever order or
preference desired.45
Frequently, objective standards of decency refer back to model standards
proposed by organizations such as the American Bar Association, American
Law Institute, and National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals.46 While for the most part lower courts rely on these
standards47 in assessing standards of decency, the Supreme Court tends to
view the wisdom of such groups or agencies as merely relevant, rather than
as controlling.
It terms of the subjective prong, the Supreme Court set forth in Wilson
that there must be an inquiry into the state of mind for the prison guard or
administrator responsible for the conduct at issue in an Eighth Amendment
prisoner claim.48 To constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the practice in

	
  
42. Roderick Oxford, Eighth Amendment ETS Claims: A Matter of Human Dignity,
18 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 505, 519 (1993) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 329
(1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)); see also Mushlin, supra, note 11 at 92 n.7 (quoting
Judge Posner’s opinion, from Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1315 (7th Cir.
1988), where he wrote, “[t]he conditions in which prisoners are housed, like the poverty
line, is a function of a society’s standard of living. As that standard rises, the standard of
minimum decency of prison conditions, like the poverty line, rises too.”).
43. Brittany Glidden, Necessary Suffering?: Weighing Government and Prisoner
Interests in Determining What Is Cruel and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1815, 181516 (2012).
44. Id.
45. Oxford, supra note 42, at 529.
46. Mushlin, supra note 11, at 94 (discussing model standards proposed by various
organizations).
47. See e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 567 n.10 (10th Cir. 1980) (articulating
the Supreme Court’s view of minimum standards of decency by arguing “[w]hile . . . a
variance from state standards or from standards promulgated by certain professional
organizations does not establish a per se constitutional violation, it is a factor to be
considered in determining whether contemporary standards of decency have been met.”).
48. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 301 (1991).

230

The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy

Vol. XXX:1

question must necessarily be characterized as some form of punishment,
otherwise there is no constitutional prohibition against it. 49 If a claim
involves brutality by guards, “the inmate must prove that the defendants
acted with malice,” if, however, “the claim concerns a prison condition, the
right to safety and protection from inmate assaults, or prison medical care,
the lesser standard of ‘deliberate indifference’ . . . applies.”50 Overall, “no
matter how objectively deplorable” a prison condition is, said condition
might only be found unconstitutional if it “was imposed with the requisite
scienter by prison officials.”51
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRISON FOOD
A. Food in General
The Eighth Amendment is a safeguard against subhuman conditions for
incarcerated individuals. 52 Once the government imprisons someone, it
assumes the responsibility of protecting his or her well-being during that
period of incarceration.53 As the only source for food for prisoners, the state
must ensure that all prisoners are provided with “nutritionally adequate food
that is prepared and served under conditions which do not present an
immediate danger to the health and well being of the inmates who consume
it.”54
Historically, food was tied closely to a system of rewards or
punishments—mainly as a tool to foster obedience. 55 Throughout the
nineteenth century, “incoming prisoners were provided typically with bread
and water until they had earned the right for such luxuries as meat or
cheese.”56 However, in the twentieth century, during the rise of the medical

	
  
49. Mushlin, supra note 11, at 98.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 98-99.
52. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (“The also imposes duties on these
officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must
ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. . . .”).
53. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (“When a person is
institutionalized—and wholly dependent on the State . . . a duty to provide certain
services and care does exist, although even then a State necessarily has considerable
discretion in determining the nature and scope of its responsibilities.”).
54. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 571 (10th Cir. 1980).
55. MARY BOSWORTH, THE U.S. FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM 73-77 (2002).
56. Id. at 73.
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model of rehabilitation, 57 “individualized treatment” based on “the
positivistic beliefs . . . in the potential of science” gained favor.58 This
medical-based model helped shift the focus away from obedience and
towards “scientific notions of nutrition.”59 Consequently, the mainstream
belief was that “[h]ealthy prisoners . . . would be productive workers and,
ultimately, reformed citizens.”60
In more modern times, prison standards have improved somewhat, yet,
unsurprisingly, limited finances restrict most correctional facilities. In fact,
some institutions manage with a total operational budget amounting to less
than $3.00 a day per inmate.61 With such limited funds, it should come as
no surprise that prisoners are often dissatisfied with the food provided.62
At a minimum, prisoners are allotted no less than fifteen minutes to eat
their meals.63 Most correctional standards also require that food be served
in “congregate settings” except when security reasons override.64 Former
pleasantries from life outside of jail are not always provided or even
constitutionally protected.65 For example, there is no constitutional right to
coffee. 66 However, with respect to inmates’ nutritional concerns, some
institutions do make a point of offering healthier options of that day’s “main
meal, and even go so far as to provide a salad bar.”67

	
  
57. Dean J. Spader, Megatrends in Criminal Justice Theory, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 157,
180 (1986).
58. Id.
59. BOSWORTH, supra note 55, at 73 (“Prison diets were examined for the calorific
content rather than used primarily as a means of control.”).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 74 (“As Seth M. Ferranti points out, ‘Whenever you have inmates making
the food and they don’t care, the food will suck. . . . It all depends on the given
situation.”).
63. Mushlin, supra note 11, at 271.
64. Id.
65. Lane v. Hutcheson, 794 F. Supp. 877, 884 (E.D. Mont. 1992). The court noted
that “discomfort alone” is not a constitutional violation. In Lane, the inmate complained,
inter alia, about poor ventilation which resulted in hot prison conditions, lack of access to
fresh fruits and vegetables, and no access to a glass mirror. Id.
66. Id. at 882-83 (“Unlike life outside of the jail, inmates are not allowed to “raid the
refrigerator” thereby having unlimited access to food. This is simply one of life’s
pleasures that confinement must restrict for safety and security reasons.”).
67. BOSWORTH, supra note 55, at 73-77 (“Most prisons these days also have a salad
bar and offer a ‘hearty healthy’ version of the main meal. Fried chicken and baked
chicken, or French fries and baked potatoes may be served at the same meal.”).
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B. Power Struggles & Inmate Defiance
In correctional institutions, food generally symbolizes “the complexity of
power relations between inmates and staff.”68 Decisions about food are just
one aspect of control that inmates lose upon incarceration. The stark
contrast is that “in outside society dietary habits serve to establish and
symbolize control over one’s body . . . [but] [i]n prison, that control is taken
away as the prisoner and their [sic] body become the objects of external
forces.”69 Although each prisoner eventually adapts to the restrictions of
incarceration, some inmates frequently challenge their subordinate roles by
acting out in visibly defiant ways against the authority figures.70 While
some inmates show their defiance by refusing to return trays, others resort to
more drastic means by hurling a mixture of food and human waste at
guards.71
Aside from regularly scheduled meals, “[p]rison canteens can offer
prisoners some avenues for accessing foods that they crave or associate with
home or their cultural heritage.”72 However, such choices are limited to
those more powerful “inmates who possess the wealth—in whatever form of
currency—to buy.” 73 Interestingly, these outside choices can present
additional problems for correctional guards, since the food and its packaging
can at times be used for contraband concealment.74 For example, “Kit Kat
chocolate bars . . . can be purchased at many prison canteens. But because
the silver foil the Kit Kats are wrapped in can be used for taking drugs, the
bars are stockpiled and traded at exorbitantly high rates.” 75 Similarly,
“[f]ruit bought at the canteen or taken from the mess halls can be illegally

	
  
68. Avi Brisman, Fair Fare?: Food As Contested Terrain in U.S. Prisons and Jails,
15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 49, 54 (2008) (citing Gill Valentine & Beth
Longstaff, Doing Porridge: Food and Social Relations in a Male Prison, 3 J. MATERIAL
CULTURE 131, 132 (1998)).
69. Brisman, supra note 68 at, 54 (citing Catrin Smith, Punishment and Pleasure:
Women, Food and the Imprisoned Body, 50 A.M. SOC. REV. 197, 202 (2002)).
70. Brisman, supra note 68, at 73 (citing Rebecca Godderis, Dining In: The Symbolic
Power of Food in Prison, 43 HOW. J. CRIM. JUST. 255, 260 (2006)).
71. Brisman, supra note 68, at 74 (stating that typically, a mixture of urine and feces
is thrown at the eyes and face of guards. “Humiliation is the name of the game and is one
of the few ways prisoners have to degrade their keepers”)(quoting CARL SIFKIS, THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS 238 (2003)).
72. Brisman, supra note 68, at 76.
73. Id. at 77.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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turned into alcohol, called ‘pruno,’ which can be traded, sold or
consumed.”76
Hunger strikes are another common form of prisoner defiance. 77
According to the Code of Federal Regulations on Judicial Administration, a
hunger strike is defined officially as a prisoner who “communicates that fact
to staff and is observed by staff to be refraining from eating for a period of
time, ordinarily in excess of 72 hours.” 78 This self-starving behavior is
usually done to effectuate change.79 Most interesting is the dual-effect that
hunger strikes may have by highlighting how well officials do (or do not)
respond. On one hand, by permitting a hunger strike the State may appear to
devalue prisoners’ lives.80 However, the alternative would be to intervene
by force-feeding, an effort the prisoner may challenge, which ultimately
“turns an illegitimate activity—the hunger strike—into a legitimate one.”81
IV. A CROSS-SECTION OF CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT COMPLAINTS
A. Shrader v. White
Every cruel and unusual punishment claim is different in some manner,
but most if not all, give a unique snapshot into life behind bars. For
example, in Shrader v. White, inmates at Virginia State Penitentiary brought
a class action suit against prison officials stating, inter alia, that “various
conditions of their confinement violated the eighth amendment’s
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.”82 Here, the Shrader
court addressed inmate concerns about prison weapons, showers, inadequate
heating and ventilation, the general disrepair of prisons, and oddly enough, a
“pigeon” nest problem. 83 With respect to the pigeon nests, inmates
expressed concern that the presence of birds might create a health risk,
particularly from a sanitary point of view, because “pigeon feces and
pigeons inside of the building increase the opportunity for the occurrence
and transmission of certain mycotic diseases.”84 On this point, no evidence

	
  
76. Id. (citing Gill Valentine & Beth Longstaff, Doing Porridge: Food and Social
Relations in a Male Prison, 3 J. MATERIAL CULTURE 131, 140 (1998)).
77. Brisman, supra note 68, at 79.
78. Id. at 80 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 549.61 (2005)).
79. Brisman, supra note 68, at 77.
80. Id. at 88 (citing Lionel Wee, The Hunger Strike as a Communicative Act:
Intention without Responsibility, 17 J. LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 61, 70 (2007)).
81. Brisman, supra note 68, at 88.
82. Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 977 (4th Cir. 1985).
83. Id. at 975-84.
84. Id. at 984.
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was ever introduced that demonstrated if any inmate actually suffered from
the presence of pigeons. 85 With respect to the sanitary conditions of
showers, the court noted while there were rust stains and possible
momentary loss of cold water as a result of toilets flushing, there was simply
no evidence that inmates suffered injury as a result. 86
On the more pertinent issue of food service in this note, the Shrader case
reinforced the well-established principle that inmates must receive
nutritionally adequate food, “prepared and served under conditions which do
not present an immediate danger to the health and well being of the inmates
who consume it.”87 Here, the parties involved stipulated that when food was
properly prepared and stored, the menu met the requirements for
nutritionally adequate meals. 88 However, the inmates’ main dispute in
Shrader was that food was not in fact properly stored, prepared, or served.89
In its analysis of the food, the court compared the plaintiff-inmates claims
against the veracity of defense witnesses.90 The court stated, “if one were to
believe the plaintiffs’ inmate witnesses, rarely a meal is served that does not
consist of: (1) raw food; (2) rotten food; or (3) contaminated food.”91 On the
other hand, “[t]he defendants presented evidence of a Four-Star restaurant
with excellent management procedures.”92 I n this case, the court’s primary
focus was on making credibility determinations.93 Accordingly, the court
found that the record “reveals no evidence of outbreaks of food poisoning,
diarrhea, or other diseases which are indicative of unhealthy conditions in
the preparation or handling of food.”94 Furthermore, “there is no evidence
of either malnutrition or ‘sub-clinical manifestations’ of malnutrition, such
as increased dental problems, loss of appetite, reduced capacity to work,
ward off disease, cope with stress, etc.”95
Overall, the Shrader case serves as an important data point for cruel and
unusual punishment claims, as the opinion arguably articulated the correct
position that judicial assessment of prison conditions “spring[s] from
constitutional requirements” rather than from a “court’s [particular] idea of

	
  
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
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95.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 986 (citing Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 571 (10th Cir. 1980)).
Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 986 (4th Cir. 1985).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 986 (4th Cir. 1985).
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how to best operate a detention facility.”96 In other words, judges should not
subjectively dictate or speculate on how prisons might best operate, or
selectively impose standards.97 Likewise, the Shrader court also emphasized
the harsh reality first articulated in Rhodes v. Chapman, that “the
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons . . . cannot
be free of discomfort.”98 Ultimately, the Shrader court affirmed the district
court’s findings that the prisoners’ claims lacked substance to prove Eighth
Amendment violations on the part of prison officials.99
B. Walker v. Johnson
In Walker v. Johnson, a prisoner claimed that his constitutional rights
were violated during an emergency lockdown of the prison for security
reasons.100 Among other grievances, the inmate claimed he was fed cold,
nutritionally deficient meals, received insufficient medical attention, and had
no access to fresh air or outdoor exercise.101 Referencing an unpublished
opinion on similar facts, the Court concluded that the restrictions imposed
by the prison officials, though harsher than usual, remained constitutional, as
they were implemented to further legitimate governmental interests in
preserving order and safety.102
The decision in Walker represents an all too common response in cruel
and unusual punishment cases where a prisoner merely asserts a litany of
claims without offering the requisite support to establish any actual
violation.103 Here the court’s finding is representative of such a response.
Where the allegation was that meals were inadequate and cold, the court
found that inmates need only be provided with nutritionally adequate

	
  
96. Id. at 986 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 (1981)).
97. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (“Eighth Amendment judgments
should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices;
judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent.”)
(quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
98. Shrader, 761 F.2d at 987 (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349).
99. Shrader, 761 F. 2d at 981.
100. Johnson v. Williams, 768 F. Supp. 1161, 1163 (E.D. Va. 1991). According to
Virginia Department of Corrections guidelines, an institutional lockup exists as a security
measure when one or more inmates are temporarily confined during an investigation. See
VA. DEPT. OF CORR. ADULT INSTITUTIONAL SERVICES GUIDELINE 411(III)(J) (Apr. 2,
1979).
101. Johnson 768 F. Supp. at 1163.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1164 (reiterating that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient facts or at time
even state a constitutional violation).
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food.104 The court reasoned that a cold bag lunch provided in lieu of a hot
meal is not inherently less nutritious or unsanitary than a hot meal. 105
Similarly, with respect to the claim of inadequate medical attention, the
court found that the inmate failed to establish any hard evidence of
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. 106 Finally, the claims about
excessive heat and cold failed because the inmate did not provide concrete
evidence that the conditions resulted in serious medical or emotional
deterioration.107
One of the more relevant issues raised in Johnson revolves around the
question of inmate access to recreation and outdoor exercise.108 As the court
noted, the Fourth Circuit in Sweet v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections
previously held that a limitation, such as solitary confinement or restriction
to exercise, that is ongoing for an extended period of time is harmful to
prisoner health constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.109 However, in
Johnson the court ruled that based on security reasons for the lockdown, any
restrictions on the opportunity to exercise outdoors did not violate
constitutional protections.110 More importantly, the record indicated that
although opportunities were restricted, prisoners still had limited access
outside of their cells and were still allowed to leave individual confinement
approximate two hours every day, and allowed outdoor exercise twice a
week, negating the prisoners Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual
punishment.111 Overall, the Court determined that because the decisions
made were penologically justified, no violation occurred.112

	
  
104. Id. at 1165 (quoting Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 986 (4th Cir. 1985)).
105. Johnson v. Williams, 768 F. Supp. 1161, 1165 (E.D. Va. 1991). See also Burgin
v. Nix, 899 F.2d 733, 734 (8th Cir.1990) (holding sacked meals provide an adequate
diet).
106. Id. at 1165 (“Indeed, plaintiff provides no specific facts regarding the alleged
deprivation of medical treatment. By contrast, defendants state that the plaintiff requested
medical attention on two occasions and that each request was addressed promptly.”).
107. Id. at 1166. The record indicated that maintenance workers continually made
efforts to repair windows, but not all windows could be completed simultaneously.
Moreover, there is no evidence that the conditions fell below minimal civilized measures
of life’s necessities.
108. Id. at 1167.
109. Id. at 1167 (citing Sweet v. South Carolina Dep’t of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854,
865–66 (4th Cir.1975)).
110. Id. (“[C]onsidering the circumstances and the need for security, prison officials
had not other alternative but to restrict prisoners to their cells in order to prevent another
outbreak of violence.”).
111. Johnson v. Williams, 768 F. Supp. 1161, 1167 (E.D. Va. 1991).
112. Id.
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V. A CROSS-SECTION OF OPINIONS ABOUT FOOD
A. Hamm v. DeKalb County
In Hamm v. DeKalb County, a pretrial detainee complained that he was
incarcerated in DeKalb County Jail from 1979 until 1982 during which time
“food occasionally contained foreign objects.”113 A district court entered
judgment for defendants, and the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the district
court correctly applied the standards with respect to food served to
inmates. 114 Specifically, the Constitution mandates at a minimum that
“reasonably adequate food” be provided in order for the cruel and unusual
punishment standard to be passed.115 Going further, “the fact the food
occasionally contains foreign objects or sometimes is served cold, while
unpleasant, does not amount to a constitutional deprivation.”116
B. Rodriguez v. Briley
In Rodriguez v. Briley, an Illinois state prisoner appealed an earlier
summary judgment ruling and claimed that prison officials had inflicted
cruel and unusual punishment by “denying him showers and withholding
meals.” 117 Inmate Rodriguez failed to comply with a prison rule that
required him to store certain belongings in a particular box, which would
promote safety, security, and facilitate swift cell searches for guards.118 As a
consequence for noncompliance, he was not permitted to leave his cell to go
to the prison cafeteria. In addition, during an 18-month period, inmate
Rodriguez “missed 75 showers and between 300 to 350 meals, with various
consequences that included a rash, fatigue, and a loss of 90 pounds.”119
The Seventh Circuit ruled that Rodriguez “punished himself” and that as
soon as “Rodriguez puts his belongings in the storage box, he can leave his

	
  
113. Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1569 (11th Cir. 1985).
114. Id. at 1569.
115. Id. at 1575.
116. Id. (citing Hoitt v. Vitek, 497 F.2d 598, 601 (1st Cir. 1974)).
117. Rodriguez v. Briley, 403 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 2005).
118. Id.
119. Id. (The court sarcastically noted, “[n]ot that [inmate Rodriguez] needed those 90
pounds, since, before he started skipping meals, he weighed between 250 and 300 pounds
and he is only 5 feet 8 inches tall.”). Id.
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cell and go to the cafeteria.”120 In addressing Rodriguez, Judge Posner wrote
the following:
Suppose [Rodriguez] announced that he would skip dinner every
day unless he were served champagne and caviar at least one a
month. He, not the prison, would be the author of his being denied
dinner. A prisoner cannot force the prison to change its rules by
going on a hunger strike and blaming the prison for his resulting
loss of weight.121
Judge Posner wisely noted that only certain reasons would justify
intervening in this case, including if a refusal to eat turned suicidal, or if
such noncompliance were the product of insanity; however, neither
condition was a factor here.122
C. Varricchio v. County of Nassau
In Varricchio v. County of Nassau, an inmate claimed that he received
tainted food that consisted of bodily waste, staples, metal pins, and soap, and
that as a result of unbearable pains and bloody stools, the he went on a
hunger strike. 123 The court denied the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment because the inmate’s complaint raised sufficient facts to plead a
claim of cruel and unusual punishment. 124 The court was particularly
influenced by allegations that sheriffs were placing bets on when the inmate
would give up his hunger strike and begin eating meals again.125 For the
Varricchio court, the subjective prong might be satisfied if the sheriffs were
aware of a serious harm, yet chose to do nothing about it.126 The court also
noted that the inmate claimed he was brought to the medical department and
later to a hospital for x-rays, yet the inmate maintained he was never actually
treated for his problems.127
Although the underlying merits of the cruel and unusual punishment claim
were not adjudicated at this stage, the Varricchio example still raises some
concern over inmate veracity and what might constitute sufficient proof of

	
  
120. Id. at 953 (“[H]e was not punished, and so we need not decide whether, or how
many, skipped meals constitute a cruel and unusual punishment for violation of a valid
prison regulation.”).
121. Id. (citing Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998)).
122. Id.; see generally Matos ex rel. Matos v. O’Sullivan, 335 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir.
2003); Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 729 (7th Cir. 2001).
123. Varricchio v. County of Nassau, 702 F. Supp. 2d 40, 47 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
124. Id. at 56.
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fact. In its analysis, the Varricchio court reinforces the common view that
food served violates the Eighth Amendment if an inmate proves nutritional
inadequacy or preparation, or the food somehow presents an immediate
danger to his or her health and well-being.128 However, in this instance, the
prisoner merely alleged that his food contained staples, metal pins and soap
without actually articulating anything more than his personal conclusion that
food was contaminated.129 Assuming arguendo, that even one meal was
contaminated, the suspicion that subsequent meals would be contaminated
amounts to a self-imposed hunger strike not based on fact, but rather on
speculation. A more important question remains as to how an inmate, with
limited resources and abilities, might even factually preserve evidence of
deliberate food contamination, especially if it only occurred once. If the
contamination was deliberate or a form of retaliation from guards, in all
likelihood those very same guard or guards would be able to destroy that
evidence. On some level, Varricchio, like Shrader above, reinforces the
difficult burden that inmates face in preserving evidence, or actually
supporting allegations in a sufficient manner.
D. Greene v. Esgrow
In Greene v. Esgrow, an inmate was placed on a pre-hearing restricted diet
for seven days as a result of allegations that he spat at a staff member from
his cell in October 2008.130 After that inmate was found guilty of those
charges, the inmate was subsequently sentenced to twelve months of
confinement in the special housing unit, and twenty-one more days of a
restricted diet.131 The court found nothing in the record to indicate that the
post-hearing restricted diet was cruel and unusual punishment or in violation
of New York State regulations for restricted diets. 132 New York State
regulations require, among other things, that medical staff check on the
inmate’s health within twenty-four hours of being on the restricted diet, and
that any physician, nurse, or physician’s assistant shall make a weekly

	
  
128. Id. at 57 (citing Chapdelaine v. Keller, No. 95–CV–1126, 1998 WL 357350, at
*12 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1998)).
129. Varricchio v. County of Nassau, 702 F. Supp. 2d 40, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
130. Greene v. Esgrow, 686 F. Supp. 2d 240, 241 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
131. Id.
132. Id.; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 304.2 (1999) (noting that a restricted
diet must be comprised of sufficient quality of wholesome and nutritious food, and that a
physician, nurse or physician’s assistant, shall examine the inmate’s health within 24
hours of the initiation of the restricted diet, and on a daily basis during the restriction
period).
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written report regarding the inmate’s condition, or if there is a
recommendation that the diet should stop.133
VI. AN ANALYSIS OF NUTRALOAF DECISIONS
The first issue with nutraloaf is discerning exactly what the food is made
from.134 As Judge Posner wrote, nutraloaf “isn’t a proprietary food like
Hostess Twinkies but, like ‘meatloaf’ or ‘beef stew,’ a term for a composite
food the recipe of which can vary from institution to institution, or even
from day to day within an institution.” 135 Adding to the confusion,
“nutraloaf could meet requirements for calories and protein one day yet be
poisonous the next if, for example, made from leftovers that had spoiled.”136
According to prison officials, nutraloaf is simply a tool “for behavior
modification.” 137 While prison officials maintain that nutraloaf is a
“complete meal,” inmates counter that it is “so awful they’d [sic] rather go
hungry.”138
For shooting suspect Christopher Williams, the nutraloaf he was served in
2008 is typical—it contained “a mixture of cubed whole wheat bread,
nondairy cheese, raw carrots, spinach, seedless raisins, beans, vegetable oil,
tomato paste, powdered milk and dehydrated potato flakes.”139 According to
Vermont Corrections Commissioner Rob Hofmann, nutraloaf is a
“mechanism that dissuades inmates from throwing feces, urine trays and
silverware . . . [that] tends to have the desired outcome.”140 Hoffman added,
“[o]nce the offender relents, we stop with the nutraloaf. That’s our goal, to
protect our staff.”141
The real challenge is whether the nutraloaf is, of itself, a form of cruel and
unusual punishment. Furthermore, there is a question over whether that

	
  
133. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 304.2.
134. Prude v. Clarke, 675 F.3d 732, 733 (7th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied (Apr. 19, 2012)
(“Nutriloaf (also spelled ‘nutraloaf’) is a bad-tasting food given to prisoners as a form of
punishment (it is colloquially known as ‘prison loaf’ or ‘disciplinary loaf’”)).
135. Id. at 734.
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137. Wilson Ring, Prison Calls It Food, Inmates Disagree, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar.
23,
2008),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/03/23/prison-calls-it-foodinma_n_92953.html.
138. Id.
139. Id. (Christopher Williams, who was 29 in 2008, was “charged in a 2006 school
shooting that killed two people in Essex[, VT]” and was “given nutraloaf after he had
assaulted guards and smeared excrement in his cell.”).
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punishment is truly harmful, or alternatively, whether the food (if prepared
properly) is a nutritious, albeit generally unappetizing, form of sustenance
for inmates.
A. Gilcrist v. Kautzky
One of the earliest references to nutraloaf in a judicial opinion is the 1989
case of Gilcrist v. Kautzky.142 In Gilcrist, an inmate alleged that prison staff
used nutraloaf as a form of punishment in direct violation of Washington
Administrative Code 137-28-110, which explicitly stated that “lowering the
quantity or quality of food and deprivation of clothing, bedding, bed, or
normal hygienic implements shall not be used as sanctions.”143 Directing its
attention to nutraloaf, the Court noted that nutraloaf is “alleged to be an
unhealthy ground mass of food which looks like dog food.”144 By raising a
due process challenge instead of a cruel and unusual punishment claim, the
inmate successfully argued that the state protections created an entitlement
that food quality would not diminish as a form of punishment.145 The Court
agreed and explained that the wording of the administrative code left no
room for doubt.146
B. LeMaire v. Maass
One of the most frequently cited cases on nutraloaf is the 1993 case of
LeMaire v. Maass.147 In LeMaire, an inmate sued the Superintendent of the
Oregon prison, alleging that he suffered cruel and unusual punishment
during his time in a disciplinary segregation unit.148 LeMaire was first sent
to disciplinary segregation after attacking a prison guard in February of
1986, and then just ten days after being transferred back into the general
population, he savagely attacked and attempted to kill a fellow inmate with a

	
  
142. Gilcrist v. Kautzky, No.88-3869, 876 F.2d 896, at *3 (9th Cir. Jun 2, 1989).
143. Id. (citing WASHINGTON ADMIN. CODE 137-28-110 (1986), an implementing
regulation of Washington law).
144. Id. Interestingly, the court did not look deeper into the allegations of whether or
not nutraloaf was unhealthy, nor did it specifically seek information about what
ingredients were used. Id.
145. Id. (noting that the inmate had a protected interest that was created by
Washington State law).
146. Id. The lowering of the quality of food as a sanction is not an option under the
Washington prison system. Thus, Gilcrist has a protected interest established by
Washington law. Id.
147. LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 1993).
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ten to twelve inch sharpened, black rod. 149 Based on his record,
Superintendent Maass concluded that “LeMaire represents a serious threat to
the safety and well-being of others within the Oregon State Penitentiary.”150
LeMaire had more than twenty-five violations at the time he complained that
six practices of the disciplinary segregation unit constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. 151
In particular, LeMaire challenged Oregon
Administrative Rule 291-83-015(1), and the use of nutraloaf to combat food
violations.152
In its analysis, the court applied the two part subjective and objective test
from Wilson. 153 The court noted the security constraints that the
Superintendent faced, and clearly articulated that there must be some level
of wantonness established for the inmate to prevail.154 With respect to the
inmate’s placement on a controlled feeding of nutraloaf, the court overruled
the district court’s determination that nutraloaf was unconstitutional largely
because it found that the objective prong in Wilson was not satisfied.155
Specifically, the court reiterated that the Eighth Amendment simply requires
food that is adequate to maintain health, and that “it need not be tasty or
aesthetically pleasing.”156 However, the court distinguished the 1978 case of
Hutto v. Finney by noting that in that case the food substance “grue” [sic]
only provided 1000 calories a day, whereas in this case nutraloaf provides
“an excess of nutritional requirements . . . and LeMaire, unlike the Hutto
inmates who lost weight, has actually gained some sixty pounds in
confinement.”157 Whether or not weight gain is an indication of nutritional

	
  
149. Id. at 1448 (LeMaire admitted that he approached the victim “wanting to go for
his spine.”).
150. Id. (citing numerous examples where LeMaire would ram his head into an
officer’s chest, intentionally bang trays on bars in order to rile up other inmates, and
instances where he would refuse to return his tray after morning meals. LeMaire also
assaulted corrections officers with food, hot water, urine, and feces).
151. Id. at 1449.
152. Id.
153. LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1451 (9th Cir. 1993)(citing Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
154. LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1452 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21
(1986)).
155. LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1455-56 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298).
156. LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1456 (citing Cunningham v. Jones, 567 F.2d 653, 659-60
(6th Cir. 1997).
157. LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1456 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978)).
In LeMaire, the court noted that nutraloaf is made by blending a variety of foods from the
standard meals served to inmates, that only fresh ingredients are used, and that recipes are
nutritionally balanced. It continued to say that, “while not particularly appetizing,
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quality is up for debate, nevertheless the court was convinced that LeMaire
was not being starved.158
Most importantly, the Court articulated that the use of nutraloaf is not
“incompatible with ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.’”159 In particular, the court emphasized that
any routine discomfort from nutraloaf does not amount to a denial of
minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities, and so it falls short of an
Eighth Amendment violation.160 In dictum, the court went on to say that
even if the serving of nutraloaf met the objective prong, LeMaire also failed
to show that any prison officials had the sufficiently culpable state of mind
required to satisfy the subjective prong.161
C. Prude v. Clarke
In Prude v. Clarke, a Seventh Circuit case from 2012, a plaintiff brought a
civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the staff of the Milwaukee
County Jail based on several visits where he was exclusively fed
nutraloaf.162 As the court noted, “[o]n the second and third stays . . . the jail
fed him only ‘nutriloaf,’ pursuant to a new policy the jail had adopted of
making nutraloaf the exclusive diet of prisoners who had been in segregation
in prison at the time of their transfer to the jail.” During his third stay, the
plaintiff had been fed nutraloaf for two days and “began vomiting his meals
and experiencing stomach pains and constipation.”163 After deciding not to
eat the nutraloaf provided, the plaintiff relied on meals of bread and water
for the remaining eight days he was at the jail, although as the court notes,

	
  
[nutraloaf] does exceed an inmate’s minimal daily requirements for calories, protein, and
vitamins.” Id. at 1455.
158. LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1456 (stating “LeMaire is not being starved. He is being fed,
and he is being fed adequately.”).
159. Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)). See also Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
160. LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1456 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347
(1981)).
161. LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1456 (“There is not a scintilla of evidence in this record to
indicate that the officials imposing Nutraloaf were either deliberately indifferent to
LeMaire’s health or welfare”).
162. Prude v. Clarke, 675 F.3d 732, 733 (7th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied (Apr. 19, 2012)
(“The plaintiff is serving time in a Wisconsin state prison, but was transferred to the
county jail on several occasions to enable him to attend court proceedings relating to a
post-conviction petition he had filed.”).
163. Id.
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“it’s unclear how he obtained the bread.”164 As a result, the plaintiff lost
fourteen pounds after his second and third stays, a total of 8.3 percent of his
weight. 165 To combat his vomiting, a guard sent the plaintiff to the
infirmary where a nurse provided him with stool softener and antacids.166
However, once the plaintiff transferred back to state prison “he continued
experiencing painful defecation and bloody stools . . . and he was diagnosed
with an anal fissure.”167
In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants submitted what
Judge Posner referred to as a “preposterous affidavit” in which a sheriff’s
officer matter-of-factly stated that “[n]utraloaf has been determined to be a
nutritious substance for regular meals.” 168 In addition, Judge Posner
determined that “[n]o evidence was presented concerning the recipe for or
ingredients of the nutraloaf that was served at the county jail during the
plaintiff’s sojourns there.”169 In fact, “the recipe was among the items of
information that the plaintiff sought in discovery” and was never
produced.170 Judge Posner chastised the defendant prison officials for their
failure to file a brief as well as their failure to respond to a court order to
show cause regarding the failure.171
Ultimately, Judge Posner found that any “deliberate withholding of
nutritious food or substitution of tainted or otherwise sickening food, with
the effect of causing substantial weight loss, vomiting, stomach pains, and
maybe an anal fissure . . . or other severe hardship would violate the Eighth
Amendment.”172 Judge Posner was careful to note that not all nutraloaf is
“unhealthful, though all is reputed to have an unpleasant taste.”173 Instead,
the key factor was that “other prisoners in the jail also vomited after eating
the nutraloaf, and this suggests that it was indeed inedible.”174 Since the
defendants submitted no evidence suggesting otherwise, Judge Posner found
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that it was a possible inference that “jail officials were aware that the
nutraloaf [was] being fed [to] the prisoners” and that the nutraloaf was
making the plaintiff sick, but the officials did nothing about it.175 For Judge
Posner, the lack of response would amount to “deliberate indifference [to] a
serious health problem and thus an Eighth Amendment claim.”176
D. Criticism of Prude v. Clarke
Aside from the obvious fact that Judge Posner was irritated with the
prison officials for their failure to comply with the judicial process, there are
still troubling aspects to the decision in Prude v. Clarke.177 In keeping with
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Wilson v. Seiter, Eighth Amendment claims
have to be supported by proof of an objective and a subjective component.178
Judge Posner, however, merely focused on deliberate indifference,
specifically whether the agents of the state were somehow culpable in
permitting nutraloaf to make the plaintiff sick without doing anything in
response.179 However, a closer examination of the existing record makes it
clear that the jail officials did in fact do something. 180 Judge Posner
acknowledges that the plaintiff “tried to solve the problem by speaking with
a [correctional officer]” and that after his second complaint he was “taken to
the clinical office to be seen by a nurse.”181 By definition, doing nothing
would amount to being non-responsive and indifferent to the inmate’s
requests for help. Nevertheless, the nurse at the facility provided the
plaintiff with antacids and stool softener, which by definition also amounts
to providing the plaintiff with a reasonable remedy to his medical
concerns.182
Moreover, Judge Posner relies on the questionable assumption that
“[a]dult vomiting other than because of illness or drunkenness is rare—
healthy, sober adults do not vomit a meal just because it doesn’t taste
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good—and if the plaintiff is being truthful there was a veritable epidemic of
vomiting during his stay.”183 However, this line of thinking is problematic
as it places too much weight on the credibility of prisoner’s testimony and
biased recollection. There is simply no evidence, other than the plaintiff’s
own testimony that the nurse he visited found his weight loss “alarming,”
and that other inmates were similarly vomiting from the nutraloaf. 184
Moreover, without the actual recipe there is simply no evidence to suggest
that the nutraloaf was not nutritious or was tainted. Likewise, there is no
evidence to suggest that the plaintiff was not somehow idiosyncratic,
perhaps allergic to some of the food product in the loaf, or suffering from
some sort of ailment that would cause him to regurgitate his meals.185
The most problematic aspect of the decision is that both prongs of the
analysis set forth by the Wilson Court were not met to determine whether
feeding prisoners nutraloaf was in fact cruel and unusual punishment. First,
there is nothing in the record that suggests the nutraloaf was actually a form
of punishment, since it was distributed to all inmates regardless of their
behavior and not as a deterrent.186 Furthermore, as the prisoner in question
was actually sent to the infirmary where he was seen by a nurse, there is
nothing to suggest that the prison officials were nonresponsive or indifferent
to his alleged claims, especially when efforts were clearly made by staff to
remedy any health concerns. 187 More importantly, there is simply no
objective prong analysis that shows exactly how or why the conditions of the
nutraloaf served by the Milwaukee County Jail were objectively cruel and
unusual.188 Assuming that the food was nutritious in its total caloric value,
there appears to be no evidence, including further lawsuits by similarly
situated inmates, to corroborate this particular inmate’s story. If legitimate,
there would have been systemic, massive illness throughout the Milwaukee
County Jail, yet these claims are unsubstantiated. In the same breath that
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Judge Posner criticizes the Sheriff’s lack of expertise on the nutritional
quality of nutraloaf and dismisses his opinions as hearsay, he assumes the
role of pseudo-expert himself and relies on the plaintiff’s own hearsay as
irrefutable fact. Given the unusual circumstance that the defendants failed to
respond in this case, the plaintiff’s claims remained uncontested.
Nevertheless, this failure to respond does not necessarily ensure the
legitimacy of any claims or speak to the validity of the conditions at the
time. It would appear that Judge Posner’s distaste for the manner in which
the defendant prison staff handled the inmate’s lawsuit trumped what should
have been his impartial objectivity. What would have resulted if the prison
staff had complied with the process can therefore only be one of supposition.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Rhodes, discussed supra Section III Part A, Justice Brennan’s
concurrence wisely noted that judicial opinions about cruel and unusual
punishment do not make for pleasant reading given their subject matter.189
At the time Rhodes was decided “[t]here [were] over 8,000 pending cases
filed by inmates challenging prison conditions.”190 Among other things, the
Rhodes Court noted instances where approximately 200 men were required
to share the use of one toilet, times when cells were infested with insects,
and where food was “unappetizing and unwholesome.” 191 While
circumstances are often difficult to read, the relevant question for this Note
is whether they constitute cruel and unusual treatment.
With respect to nutraloaf specifically, so long as the minimum amount of
calories are provided to inmates, there should not be any constitutional
violations. The objective prong set forth in Wilson cannot be met absent a
showing that the nutraloaf is nutritionally deficient. While some genuine
concern exists over the precise contents of nutraloaf, so long as prisons are
clear on what ingredients are used in order to support nutritional claims,
there should be no problem. The LeMaire court correctly reinforced the fact
that meals need not be tasty or aesthetically pleasing so long as minimum
nutritional standards are met.192 If inmates want choice with respect to food,
they are permitted to supplement their needs at the commissary with junk
food. However, for those inmates that choose to threaten or assault prison
guards or other inmates, there are consequences to pay. From a practical
standpoint, most agree that nutraloaf is foul looking and unpleasant to eat,
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but that does not necessarily make it inedible or cruel. If an inmate cannot
eat nutraloaf because it is actually injuring him or her in some demonstrable
way, then there are legitimate reasons that it should not be distributed.
However, it is clear from most cases that prisoners are confusing cannot
physically eat with will not eat when it comes to nutraloaf. Generally, if
prisoners act in accordance with the rules of their confinement, then
nutraloaf will not be served. The Eighth Amendment will, and should,
protect those who are either being served less than the nutritional
requirements when it comes to food or food that is physically harmful, but
inmates cannot break the rules and subsequently cry foul solely based on
unappealing and unappetizing food.

